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Historians and naval thinkers have only slowly begun to 
understand that small navies have distinctive purposes, functions 
and characteristics in and of their own, and that they are neither 
the remnants of a past great power nor a curious emblem created 
on the way to great power status.1 
 
This paper focuses on small navies and seeks to examine the extent to which 
traditional approaches to maritime policy and strategy are relevant to them. It will 
examine alternative ways of defining what is meant by the term ‘small navy’ before 
addressing traditional interpretations about the roles and missions of navies, and of 
maritime strategy, in order to question the extent to which ‘small navies’ are different 
or distinct from their larger counterparts or, indeed, from each other. In terms of their 
size, capabilities and aspirations most navies are small. This is as true today as it has 
always been. Large navies dominate the headlines and receive ample coverage in both 
popular and academic publications but they are the exception not the rule. Their 
smaller counterparts have a lower profile except when they emerge as potential allies 
or enemies and there is a tendency to approach them in such terms, defining them by 
their relationship to larger navies regardless of whether this actually provides the most 
useful way in which to understand them. Equally, there is a tendency for historians 
and commentators to approach maritime strategy from a perspective built upon an 
examination of the activity of larger navies on the assumption that the resultant 
concepts and principles will apply to small navies as much as large ones. While this 
may be the case the relative paucity of literature devoted specifically to smaller navies 
makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions 
 
The topic is of more than mere academic interest. Small navies may not hog the 
headlines but they play an important role in maritime strategy that extends beyond 
their engagement with larger navies. This can include their role in regional power 
balances, the conduct of independent operations in support of national policy, a 
contribution to multinational missions such as those designed to suppress piracy off 
the Horn of Africa, and apparently mundane but still vital constabulary roles in 
protecting and policing territorial waters and maintaining good order at sea. The 
salience of such roles within the context of current US Maritime Strategy has been 
reflected in the emphasis placed on maritime security operations and in the support 
provided to smaller navies through initiatives such as the Africa Partnership Station, 
                                                 
1 John B. Hattendorf, ‘The US Navy and “Freedom of the Seas”, 1775-1917’ in  Rolf Hobson & Tom 
Kristiansen, Navies in Northern Waters 1721-2000, (London: Frank Cass, 2004) pp.151-2 
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whereby the US Navy engages in a supportive relationship with African navies and 
security agencies.2  Similarly, the European Union has emphasised the need to 
develop an integrated maritime policy in order to cater for maritime security and also 
for the renewable exploitation of the resources of the sea.3 Such initiatives, if they are 
to succeed, will depend on the contribution to be made by smaller navies. The subject 
thus has great contemporary relevance. Small navies may often have a low profile but 
they play an important role in local, regional and international security and they 
deserve greater attention than they have received to date. It may be foolish to assume 
that they are simply ‘scaled down’ versions of large navies.  
 
Defining a ‘small navy’ 
 
In order to begin a discussion on this topic it is first necessary to define what is meant 
by the term ‘small navy’. This is not as easy as it might at first seem. Geoffrey Till, in 
one of the few scholarly articles to address this topic directly, reflected on the 
difficulty of categorisation in a situation where a small navy is not necessarily a weak 
one and a large navy is not necessarily powerful. Till suggested that definitions need 
to take account of the size and nature of the fleet, geographic range, function and 
capability, access to high-grade technology, and reputation. 4 Matters are complicated 
by the fact that many navies might prefer not to be called ‘small’. Some prefer the 
title of ‘small state navy’ while the Royal New Zealand Navy prides itself on being 
the ‘best small nation navy’ in the world.5 Commentators linked to the Royal 
Norwegian Navy have written of the sea power of a ‘coastal state’, avoiding overt 
reference to the size of the navy.6 Such definitions are unhelpful in the context of this 
paper given that a small state or nation could, quite conceivably, have rather a large 
navy (as did the Portuguese in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the Dutch in 
the seventeenth) and a large state or nation may have a small navy (as did China until 
recently). 
 
Size, defined in terms of the number of ships, does offer one route towards a 
definition but simply counting hull numbers provides a very inadequate indication of 
a navy’s role or capabilities. Different types of ships possess different characteristics 
and tend to fill different roles. In an environment that is centred on the operation of 
complex equipment and high-tech weaponry quality tends to count for more than 
quantity. Having more ships does not necessarily equate to greater power or 
capability.7 In any case, to define small navies simply as those with fewer ships than 
large navies first requires one to define what is large. By any measure the current US 
                                                 
2 See US Navy, US Marine Corps, US Coastguard, A Co-operative Strategy for the 21st Century, 
(October, 2007). For details of the Africa Partnership Station see Commander US Naval Forces Africa, 
‘Africa Partnership Station 2012’.  http://www.naveur-navaf.navy.mil/apshome.html 
3 For details of the EU Integrated Maritime Policy see 
http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/index_en.htm  
4 Geoffrey Till, ‘Can small navies stay afloat?’ in Jane’s Navy International, May 2003. 
5 RNZN 148, Strategic Plan 2008-2025.  
6 For example see Jacob Borresen, ‘Coastal Power: The Sea Power of the Coastal State and the 
management of Maritime Resources’ in Hobson & Kristiansen, Navies in Northern Waters, pp.249-
275. 
7 For a discussion of the difficulty of assessing capability see Harold John Kearsley, ‘Rethinking 
maritime power theory’ in Comparative Strategy, 11:2, 195-211. Also see Norman Polmar, ‘The 
Measurement of Naval Strength in the Twenty-First Century’ in Andrew Dorman, Mike Lawrence 
Smith and Mathew Uttley, The Changing Face of Maritime Power, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1999) 
pp.126-136. 
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Navy is large, possessing a scale and range of capabilities denied to all others, but it is 
far from clear that this provides a useful measure against which to judge other navies. 
If there is one large navy and all others are small then that phrase is devoid of much 
meaning, particularly in situations where the size of the US Navy is not a relevant 
factor. If navies such as those of Britain and France (equipped with aircraft carriers, 
nuclear powered submarines, modern amphibious capabilities, sophisticated escort 
ships and a wide range of supporting assets) are compared to their American ally then 
they are clearly small, but when measured against most other navies they are 
decidedly large. They certainly do not consider themselves to be small and there is 
little evidence that they are viewed as such by most of their peers. The terms ‘medium 
navy’ or ‘regional navy’ are commonly used to describe the British, French, Indian 
and other navies with ambitions and capabilities larger than most, but smaller than the 
US Navy. This suggests the need for additional categories but does not contribute to 
an understanding of where the boundaries between such categories lie. 
 
As Till noted, most attempts to classify navies seek to organise them into a hierarchy 
of power and capability.8 Some systems, by focusing solely on numbers, provide little 
of value beyond demonstrating that the author is able to count vessels listed in Jane’s 
Fighting Ships.9 More satisfactory approaches incorporate qualitative as well as 
quantitative factors and produce a league table based on perceived power that might 
typically rank navies, as did Moore, in a hierarchy that includes the status symbol 
navy at the bottom and then moves to the coastal defence fleet, minor naval power, 
major naval power, and superpower as capabilities increase.10 Other systems include 
ownership of a particular weapons system, such as an aircraft carrier, as a marker for 
setting boundaries.11 However, systems that assess combat capabilities in the absence 
of other factors are unsatisfactory as they say little about real capability and nothing 
about the role or tasks of a particular navy. Does possession of an ageing carrier with 
obsolete aircraft truly represent a significant indication of power and does it tell us 
anything about the likely missions of the ship? Of rather more use are approaches 
such as those suggested by Booth or Till, that reflect the ability (or otherwise) of a 
navy to project forces beyond its own territorial waters.12 Such approaches link 
capability to intended role. Thus, an ‘ocean-going navy’, to use Booth’s term, is 
distinct from a ‘contiguous sea navy’ not merely because of its particular capabilities 
but as a reflection of its geographical reach which is itself indicative of its role and 
ambition. In a similar vein Michael Morris developed a six-fold categorisation in his 
study of third-world navies in the 1980s13 and, building on such work, Eric Grove 
developed a nine-fold categorisation as follows14: 
 
1. major global force projection navy – complete 
2. major global force projection navy – partial 
3. medium global force projection navy 
4. medium regional force projection navy 
                                                 
8 Till, ‘small navies’. 
9 See Kearsley, pp.207-9 
10 J.E. Moore (ed.), Jane’s Fighting Ships 1973-74 (London: Jane’s Publishing, 1973) p.73. 
11  See Larson, quoted in Kearsley, p.208. 
12 Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979)  pp.120-121. Geoffrey 
Till, Modern Seapower. An Introduction, (London: Brassey’s, 1987) p.47. 
13 Michael Morris, Expansion of Third World Navies, (London: Macmillan, 1987)  p.87. 
14 Eric Grove, The Future of Seapower, (London: Routledge, 1990), pp.237-240. 
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5. adjacent force projection navy 
6. offshore territorial defence navy 
7. inshore territorial defence navy 
8. constabulary navy 
9. token navy. 
 
Capabilities remain crucial to this system of categorisation but they are linked to the 
particular role and mission of the navies. Inshore territorial defence navies are 
structured and equipped as they are because of their particular role. If the role changes 
then so will the capabilities, insofar as resources allow, or, at the least, existing 
capabilities will be used in new ways to meet the new role.  
 
Navies do not emerge ready formed from the ocean according to some divine plan nor 
are they built by accident, even if it sometimes looks as if they were. They are 
developed as the result of a series of choices associated with ideas about function, role 
and capability that are enabled or constrained by a variety of factors that are both 
tangible and intangible. Systems that look at capabilities alone tell us little as they 
seek to describe the result of a process without understanding the process itself. In 
truth it makes little sense to judge navies according to some objective standard 
without reference to their intended roles. Indeed, the attempt to do so can be 
misleading. Jeremy Black’s warning against paradigm/diffusion models in military 
history is relevant here.15  Capability driven accounts ignore the importance of context 
and also of tasking. Capabilities may set the parameters of what can be achieved, but 
one cannot ignore the role of choice in deciding what it is that should be done and, 
equally, in determining which capabilities are developed and maintained. 
 
Following this logic a satisfactory definition of a small navy will focus less on its size 
vis-à-vis other navies or on particular types of equipment and will instead reflect 
limits in the range of activities that such navies seek to fulfil and also on self image. 
Till makes the point rather well, ‘small navies are different from large navies, partly 
because they have different ideas’. Unfortunately he does not provide a clear 
definition of a small navy, perhaps because clarity is not possible. Small navies are 
simply navies with ‘limited means and aspirations.’ Till argues that such navies have 
tended to have distinctive ideas about maritime strategy, being likely to focus on sea 
denial, commerce raiding and/or coastal defence rather than the ‘blue-water’ concept 
of sea control.16 The difference here is one of role rather than specifically of size 
although the two are related. Smaller navies may focus on such roles because they are 
small and would, if they could, focus on sea control. Alternately one might equally 
argue that they are small because they focus on such roles.  
 
The ability of the US Navy to make the transition from a smaller navy focusing on 
traditional small navy roles in the late nineteenth century to a large navy focused on 
sea control tasks in the early twentieth provides ample illustration of the manner in 
which a change in ambition and ideas may bring about a change in size and capability 
when ambition is met by appropriate means. The Imperial German Navy went 
through a similar transformation at roughly the same time although one could argue 
here that a continued focus on small navy roles would likely have served that state 
                                                 
15 Jeremy Black, Rethinking Military History, (London: Routledge, 2004). 
16 Till, ‘small navies’ and Geoffrey Till, ‘Series Editor’s Preface’, in Hobson & Kristiansen, Navies and 
Northern Waters, pp. (vii) – (viii) 
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much better. Sometimes the desire to follow a traditional path towards maritime 
power offers little strategic advantage. 
 
Naval roles and missions 
 
There have been numerous attempts to explain the factors that influence the 
development of maritime power and capability. Building on the work of Mahan, 
traditional approaches have suggested that geography, the availability of resources, 
the nature of the government and the perceptions and interests of the people all play a 
part in determining the extent and the nature of a state’s engagement with the sea. 
Clearly there are tangible and intangible factors that input into the decision making 
process that decides naval policy. Harold Kearsley argued that these could be broadly 
identified as physical, economic and political inputs that were translated into 
subjective outputs (missions) and objective outputs (capabilities) having been filtered 
through the subjective decision making process (see figure 1).17 
 
 
Figure 1. Components of maritime power. Harold Kearsley, (1992) 
 
 
Kearsley argued that all navies, large and small, seek to fulfil all of the missions that 
he identified (maritime diplomacy, domain maintenance, maritime presence, sea 
control/denial, sea tripwire, nautical deterrence, seapower projection). Small navies 
may have different priorities to their larger counterparts and they are likely to operate 
closer to home but they will still seek to fill each mission in some way. He goes 
further to suggest that the naval missions provide states with an ‘interlocking 
continuum of nautical guidance in dealing with their maritime interests’. No mission 
exists in isolation, the pursuit of one affects the ability to attain goals of another. The 
different missions are linked by a common hub, that of naval hardware, which 
provides the ability to fulfil the missions (see figure 2). He suggests that if any part of 
the rim (missions) is missing, or if any spokes (linking missions to equipment) are 
absent then ‘a state’s maritime output is in for a rough ride.’ To Kearsley the 
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missions represent underlying needs that remain fixed and thus provide a guiding 
framework for the use of all navies.18 
 
 
Figure 2. Maritime output wheel. Harold Kearsley, (1992) 
 
 
Kearsley’s contention that maritime missions remain constant and apply equally to all 
states reflects a common assumption that the core principles of maritime strategy 
apply to all navies regardless of size. Till’s argument that the conceptual differences 
between large and small navies are ‘more a matter of degree than of kind’ and that 
‘[t]here is, in fact, little that is special or distinctive about a smaller navy’ is typical 
of this approach and is based on the idea that strategic circumstances define the 
characteristics of a navy more than the fact that it is large or small. Thus he suggests 
that small navies face the same problems as large ones, but often seek different 
solutions.19  
 
One might question the degree to which both the inputs and outputs of maritime 
power are the same for smaller navies or, at least whether they affect small navies in 
markedly different ways. For example, all navies face resource constraints but small 
navies, denied economies of scale, may need to deal with these in particular ways. 
This may imply compromises on capability in order to maintain hull numbers, the 
adoption of modularised designs to allow for flexibility at a reasonable cost, such as 
the Danish Navy’s Flyvefisken (Flying Fish)-class vessels, or collaborative projects 
such as the Tripartite-class mine hunters built by France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands in the 1980s. Role specialisation may be one means of retaining high-end 
capabilities in one field but comes at the cost of a loss in capability elsewhere. Matters 
may be complicated by the competing desire to buy the best equipment at the lowest 
price and a political requirement to be seen to support domestic construction and thus 
jobs. Second-hand equipment provided by friends and allies may offer a short-cut 
towards capability, but such equipment is often sub-optimal for local needs or 
conditions and may come at the cost of dependency. Compromise is an inevitable 
consequence for those with shallow pockets. On the other hand, the particular needs 
                                                 
18 Ibid, p. 203-207. 
19 Till ‘Preface’ in Hobson & Kristiansen, Navies in Northern Waters. 
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of a smaller navy may not match those of a larger ally and this may spur investment 
and initiative such as the Norwegian Navy’s sponsorship of the Penguin anti-ship 
missile or the Israeli development of the Gabriel missile.20 In recessionary times cuts 
can have a disproportionate impact on a small navy, such as the Irish Naval Service, 
where the loss of a single ship would reduce the fleet by twelve per cent, threatening 
the ability of the Service to fulfil its most basic duties. 
 
Small navies also face particular personnel challenges. It may be difficult to maintain 
an appropriate training structure at a reasonable cost, implying dependence on an ally 
or some perhaps some form of partnership with the merchant marine. The Irish Naval 
Service provides an excellent example of the latter, maintaining state of the art 
training and educational facilities adjacent to the Naval Base at Cork through a public 
private partnership with Cork Institute of Technology and Focus Education.21 Even 
with such initiatives it may be difficult to ensure appropriate systems of promotion 
within a small navy in which opportunities for advancement are more limited and it 
may also be difficult to ensure an appropriate balance of ship to shore duties, with 
serious implications for both recruitment and retention. As Jacob Borresen has noted, 
it can be difficult to gain appropriate command experience in a navy with few ships 
and even the provision of sufficient sea-time may be difficult in a navy built around 
missile boats and fast attack craft, vessels that, by design, necessarily spend less time 
at sea than do larger ships.22 This may increase the importance of multi-national 
collaborations and missions if these provide the opportunity for exercises on a scale 
and command roles of a type that cannot be provided at a national level. Limited size 
may, in some cases, be a spur to close and fruitful joint cooperation, or it could see the 
navy subsumed within a larger defence organisation that is generally unsympathetic to 
its needs. 
 
It may indeed be the case that small navies share the same roles and concerns of larger 
navies but they face different challenges in meeting them. Alternately one might 
argue that the problems that they face and the solutions that they seek are unique and 
cannot usefully be examined using the same model as applied to larger navies. Further 
research is required to identify which is the case. Unfortunately, small navies have 
received relatively little attention from naval historians and maritime strategists, and 
this is particularly true of those writing in the English language. The scholar of naval 
history is blessed with an abundance of published material focusing on the two major 
navies of the past three hundred years, the British and US Navies and, by-extension, 
there is a lesser but still significant body of work that studies their main rivals. Much 
less is written on the rest, that is to say, on the majority of world navies. There are, of 
course, notable exceptions, including recent work by Lawrence Sondhaus23 and also 
Jeremy Black, whose short examination of naval power since 1500 includes a 
deliberate focus on navies and activities that are often glossed over.24 It is 
nevertheless true to say that the student seeking to research the activities of the US 
                                                 
20 For an example see Christopher Chant, Small Craft Navies, (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1992) 
also see the discussion in David Wilson (ed.), Maritime War in the Twenty-First Century, (Canberra: 
RAN Seapower Centre, 2001). 
21 For details see the National Maritime College of Ireland website, http://www.nmci.ie/ 
22 Borresen, Coastal Power’ pp.249-275. 
23 See Lawrence Sondhaus, Navies in Modern World History, (London: Reaktion Books, 2004) 
24 Jeremy Black, Naval Power. A History of Warfare at Sea from 1500, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009). 
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Navy in the twentieth century is well served by a large and vibrant body of published 
works while one interested in, say, the Royal Netherlands Navy or the Malaysian 
Navy will struggle to find appropriate material. As a scholar working in Ireland I 
should note that, until very recently, the Irish Naval Service had managed to escape 
any form of serious historical enquiry and anyone seeking a good book on this topic 
will have to write it for themselves.25 It is difficult to draw convincing conclusions 
about the roles and activities of small navies when so little is written about them. 
 
In recent years there has been much written about the Chinese Navy and on the 
maritime balance in East Asia but this simply repeats the pattern where interest, 
focuses on the major navies, their main rivals and smaller navies who are deemed 
interesting because of their relationship to their larger neighbours.26 Indeed, small 
navies are most frequently thought of in terms of their potential as allies or enemies of 
larger navies.27 This is, of course, perfectly natural and does reflect one aspect of their 
existence. However, it is important to remember that this may not actually be the role 
that defines them. While it may be the case that the Iranian Navy sees itself primarily 
as a sea denial force in the context of a potential war against the US and its allies, one 
should not assume that this is the case. For most navies it will not be true and local 
circumstances will be dominant. Given this it may be dangerous to assume that 
concepts and principles used to understand the activities of large navies are 
necessarily relevant to all others and one must avoid the temptation to understand 
small navies only through their engagement with large ones.  
 
Traditional approaches to maritime strategy 
 
Theories and concepts relating to maritime strategy have, for more than a century, 
been dominated by an Anglo-American tradition rooted in the work of the American 
Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), his British counterpart, Julian Corbett (1854-
1922) and their numerous fellow travellers. Mahan, in particular, helped to popularise 
an approach to maritime strategy that emphasised the importance of a dominant battle 
fleet able to gain command of the sea through the defeat of its opponents in decisive 
battle. Once secured such command would enable the superior fleet to blockade their 
enemy, neutralising their remaining naval assets and strangling their trade whilst 
simultaneously protecting friendly shipping and enabling expeditionary operations 
and other activities from the sea. Mahan was critical of alternative approaches that did 
not focus on command of the sea in the same way and that diverted assets away from 
the overriding requirement to gain or challenge such command. The French, in 
particular, come in for considerable criticism for their tendency to neglect the need to 
                                                 
25 There are a handful of works that relate to the Irish Naval Service, including Aidan McIvor, A 
History of the Irish Naval Service, (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006) and Tom McGinty, The Irish 
Navy: a story of courage and tenacity, (Tralee, 1995) but neither is particularly scholarly. The most 
detailed examination to date has been provided by the PhD thesis of Padraic O’Confhaola, The Naval 
Forces of the Irish State, 1922-1977 (National University of Ireland Maynooth, 2010) . 
26 For example see Toshi Yoshihara & James Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific: China’s rise and the 
Challenge to US Maritime Strategy, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010); Bernard Cole, The Great 
Wall at Sea: Second Edition. China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century, (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 2010); Ronal O’Rourke, China’s Naval Modernization. Implications for US Naval Capabilities, 
(Congressional Research Service, 2012). 
27 A good example of this is provided by Charles Koburger, Naval Warfare, Small Navies and Fat 
Merchantmen. Naval Strategies for the 1990s, (New York: Praeger, 1990). 
 9 
focus on the defeat of the enemy fleet and for favouring commerce raiding, a form of 
economic warfare that Mahan considered markedly inferior to blockade.28 
 
Corbett’s approach offered more nuance than did Mahan’s and his historical method 
was more professional. He recognised the value of gaining command of the sea, but 
also the difficulty of achieving this and tended to portray such command as an enabler 
for other things and something that was liable to be limited in its scope and duration. 
He also placed a greater emphasis than did Mahan on what we would today call ‘joint 
operations’.29 What Corbett shared in common with his American counter-part was a 
belief in the strategic utility of superior sea power derived from an historical 
examination based largely on the British experience. That is, their ideas were formed 
from an analysis of the history of the pre-eminent navy from which they derived 
‘principles’ that were designed to have relevance beyond the historical case studies 
from which they originated. They wrote so that they could influence policy. The 
degree to which they were successful is open to debate. The widespread popularity of 
Mahan’s work, and the frequency with which it was, and still is, quoted by naval 
officers and other commentators could seduce one into believing that his influence 
was all encompassing, particularly in his homeland. Famously, in the 1940s the 
former US Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, was moved to complain that the Navy 
Department frequently ‘seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a dim religious 
world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet and the United States Navy the 
only true Church’.30  
 
On the other hand, one could argue that Mahan helped to popularise ideas about 
strategy that already had considerable currency and that without Mahan the major 
navies would have adopted more or less the same policies anyway. In the case of 
Corbett, he had rather little success in persuading the pre-1914 Royal Navy to focus 
more attention on joint operations from the sea and the post-war Admiralty was 
sufficiently unimpressed with his tendency to downplay the primary importance of 
seeking out battle that they inserted a disclaimer to this effect into the official history 
of the navy in the First World War, the first three volumes of which were written by 
Corbett. He may have had more success in influencing wartime British policy towards 
trade defence, which was rather unfortunate as his ideas in this respect were badly 
flawed. 
 
Thus, one can debate the extent to which the ideas of Mahan and Corbett changed 
actual naval policy during and after their lifetimes. The least that one can say, 
however, is that they helped to set the terms within which the debates about naval 
strategy and policy were conducted.  The concepts and principles articulated and 
popularised by Mahan and Corbett inspired many others who wrote in a similar vein 
and they underpin modern approaches to maritime policy and strategy.  These ideas 
                                                 
28 See A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, (London: Sampson Low, 
Marston & Co., 1890) and A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and 
Empire, 1793-1812, (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1892). For an excellent introduction to 
Mahan’s work see Jon Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command. The Classic Worlds 
of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered, (Baltimore: John’s Hopkins Press, 1997). 
29 In particular see Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, first publ. 1911, (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1988). Also see Geoffrey Till (ed.), The Development of British Naval Thinking, 
(London: Routledge, 2006). 
30 Phillip Crowl,  ‘Alfred Thayer Mahan: the naval historian’ in Peter Paret, (ed.), Makers of Modern 
Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Princeton NJ: Princeton UP, 1996) p.444. 
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lie at the heart of much contemporary western naval doctrine and both Mahan and 
Corbett are quoted in recent doctrine publications.31  In many respects Corbett has 
rather leapfrogged Mahan in terms of apparent relevance as his focus on joint 
operations from the sea suits the emphasis on expeditionary operations that has 
characterised much western naval policy since the end of the Cold War. Of course, 
their influence extends beyond naval academies and admiralty buildings and it has 
had an important impact on academic enquiry into naval history and strategy. 
 
Richard Harding has argued that the enduring popularity of this Anglo-American 
tradition has skewed historical analysis by setting the parameters within which war at 
sea has tended to be been studied. This results in a particular focus on the success of 
the British approach in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, built around the 
importance of the battle fleet and the fight for command of the sea, and to the neglect 
of alternatives such as commerce raiding. Harding stresses that, while naval strategy 
in the age of sail may indeed have become dominated by battle fleet operations and 
the dominance of the British battle fleet may have laid the basis for their success in 
the war at sea against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, this does not mean that 
this was the only possible route to success for other nations nor that the success of the 
British model was as obvious in foresight as it has appeared in hindsight to many 
historians.32 In truth, for all except the largest navies, the most relevant histories relate 
less to the dominant Royal Navy and more to its victims. As has already been noted, 
this is an area of enquiry that is not particularly well served in English language 
publications. Mahan offers advice on what one should do to become the dominant 
navy, but has less to teach those for whom this will never be possible. The dominant 
tradition in anglophone maritime strategy and history, built upon a model derived 
initially from British success in the wars against France, and more recently from 
Anglo-American success in two world wars, may actually suggest solutions that are of 
little utility for most navies and that seduce historians and other commentators away 
from the true complexities of war at sea. 
 
The main counter to this Anglo-American tradition came from the French Jeune Ecole 
(Young School). Building on a foundation laid by Baron Richard Grivel in the 1860s 
a number of individuals, and most notably Admiral Theophile Aube and Gabriel 
Charmes, argued against trying to match the British in the battle for command of the 
sea and advocated a more asymmetric approach. Instead of seeking to gain command 
of the sea against an opponent with a larger fleet, superior industry and more helpful 
geography, they believed that British dependence on the sea could be turned against 
them by conducting a ruthless war on merchant shipping. Such a campaign would 
disrupt trade and food supplies, undermine British finance, force insurance rates to 
rise to unsustainable levels and cause social and political unrest thereby forcing the 
government to come to terms. The aim was not to starve Britain into submission, but 
rather to create an economic panic that would bring about a social and political 
collapse. In this respect they drew comfort from experience of the US Civil War, 
where an handful of Confederate raiders had preyed on Union shipping, driving 
merchant ships away from the American flag, a blow from which the US merchant 
fleet never quite recovered. They also noted how the Union blockade of Southern 
                                                 
31 For example see US Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare (1994); RAN Doctrine 1, 
Australian Maritime Doctrine (2000); Indian Maritime Doctrine (2004); and, BR1806. British 
Maritime Doctrine, 3rd edition, (2004) 
32 Richard Harding, Seapower and Naval Warfare, 1650-1830, (London: Routledge, 1999) pp.281-287. 
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cotton exports had caused significant distress in northern English manufacturing 
towns dependent on cotton mills for employment.33  
 
The approach of the Jeune Ecole was enabled by new technology, namely the 
development of steam propulsion and the self-propelled torpedo which allowed for 
the development of small, fast vessels (torpedo boats) equipped with a weapon able to 
sink the largest opponent. These ships, far cheaper than battleships, could be built in 
large numbers and would be able to drive blockading British ships from French ports. 
This, in conjunction with a limited number of coastal defence ships, would protect the 
French coast from sea borne attack and would enable steam driven commerce raiders 
to break into Britain’s vital sea lanes, sinking vessels on sight or attacking merchant 
ships in harbour. That such an approach ran foul of the 1856 Declaration of Paris, 
which outlawed such attacks on merchant ships, was of no concern to Aube, who 
believed international law to be irreconcilable with war.34  
 
The Jeune Ecole gained much currency in France, especially when Aube was 
appointed Minister of Marine in 1886, and in many other navies in the 1880s, 
particularly those of Germany and Austria-Hungary. By the end of the century, 
however, the approach had fallen out of favour. Part of the reason for this was 
technological. While torpedo boats may have possessed a potent ship-killing weapon 
they could be countered with the development of a new class of ship, the torpedo-boat 
destroyer.  The development of smokeless powder, searchlights, torpedo nets, rapid 
firing secondary armament and improved speed all made large warships rather less 
vulnerable while the development of long-range guns firing armour piercing shells 
implied that battle would continue to be decided by heavily armoured battleships able 
to slug it out with ships of equivalent size and capability. The Jeune Ecole had also 
been rather optimistic about the performance of small torpedo boats beyond coastal 
waters. Just as pertinently for the French, the strategy was only really relevant in a 
war against Britain as no other potential rival was as dependent on sea borne trade. 
Despite a range of colonial disputes and the legacy of centuries of bitter rivalry 
Britain was not France’s only or even its most likely enemy. 
 
That the Jeune Ecole may ultimately have failed to change French naval policy in the 
long term does not necessarily invalidate their relevance to lesser naval powers 
seeking to gain strategic leverage without achieving sea control. The basic logic of 
denying the use of the sea to a more powerful adversary who was dependent on such 
use lay at the heart of the German U-boat campaigns in two world wars where the 
submarine provided an offensive capability that could not be realised by the torpedo 
boats of the previous century. The contrast between the near success of the submarine 
campaign in the First World War and the strategic irrelevance of the battleships of the 
Imperial German Navy is instructive. One can only speculate on the outcome of the 
war had Germany devoted less time and treasure to the construction of the world’s 
second largest dreadnought battle fleet and more on it submarine arm but it is fair to 
                                                 
33 Arne Roksund, The Jeune Ecole. The Strategy of the Weak, (BRILL, 2007); Arne Roksund, ‘The 
Jeune Ecole: the Strategy of the Weak’ in Hobson & Kristiansen, Navies and Northern Waters, pp.117-
150; and, Lawrence Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815-1914, (London: Routledge, 2001) chapter 6. 
34 Ibid. 
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say that a Mahanian focus on decisive battle was of little use to Germany in either 
war.35  
 
However, one might question the extent to which the approach advocated by the 
Jeune Ecole is relevant to many small navies today. All of the major world economies 
are dependent on a global trading system that is itself dependent on the ability to 
move goods by sea. This does not so much provide an opportunity for small navies as 
it acts as a constraint. In a globalised world an attack on the merchant shipping of one 
state would likely have ramifications that would impact on all. It is difficult to believe 
that any of the major powers would view with satisfaction the predations of a modern 
day raider in the mould of the Graf Spee, Mowe or Alabama. This does not mean that 
economic warfare will not feature in any future war or that guerre de course will not 
re-emerge as a tool employed by navies. However, states that care about international 
law and opinion, and small powers have little option but to care, are unlikely to find 
such a strategy appealing. The costs would likely far outweigh the benefit in most 
circumstances.  
 
Writing forty years after the Jeune Ecole’s heyday, another French naval officer, 
Raoul Castex, developed a theory of strategic manoeuvre designed to allow smaller 
navies to take on larger opponents by exploiting their ability to use intelligent 
manoeuvre to create a local superiority of numbers.36 This was not dissimilar to what 
the German High Seas Fleet had been trying to do prior to the Battle of Jutland in 
1916 after which, having faced the prospect of annihilation at the hands of the 
concentrated might of the British Grand Fleet, they were much more circumspect. 
Castex’s work is of value for navies liable to find themselves at war with a larger 
counterpart and deserves to be more widely read, particularly since the original five 
volumes have been translated into English and, mercifully, abridged. Nevertheless, for 
Castex, like Mahan, the ultimate goal remained ‘mastery’ of the sea, to be achieved in 
battle where the requirement for superior numbers remained paramount. As such, his 
relevance to many small navies will be limited to circumstances where the disparity of 
strength is not too great. Nevertheless, Castex’s conclusions offer greater comfort to 
small navies than those of his contemporary, Herbert Rosinski, who wrote of the 
‘strategic helplessness of a decisively inferior fleet’.37 
 
Commerce raiding, sea denial and coastal defence 
 
Traditional interpretations suggest that small navies tend to focus less on blue-water 
sea control operations and instead concentrate, in war, on a mixture of sea denial, 
commerce raiding and/or coastal defence. They do so in order to deter or disrupt the 
activities of larger enemies without attempting to achieve sea control beyond coastal 
waters. While this does reflect a certain pattern of behaviour associated with many 
small navies it runs the risk of interpreting the activities of such navies only through 
                                                 
35 For an examination of contemporary German debates on these issues see Herbert Rosinski, ‘New 
Thoughts on Strategy’ in B. Simpson, (ed.), War, Strategy and Maritime Powers, (New Brunswick: 
Rutgens University Press, 1977) and Wolfgang Wegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War, first 
public. 1929, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989) 
36 Raoul Castex, Strategic Theories, ed. and trans. By Eugenia Kiesling (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1994) 
37 See Ian Speller, ‘Naval Warfare’ in David Jordan, James Kiras, David Lonsdale, Ian Speller, 
Christopher Tuck and C. Dale Walton, Understanding Modern Warfare, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2009) p.141. 
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their engagement with larger rivals. This may be appropriate in some circumstances 
but does little to reflect the potential diversity of roles.  
 
Many small navies operate in an environment where a larger enemy does not exist or 
where potential enemies can be left for others to deal with. For most of its existence 
the Irish Naval Service has operated in such an environment, courtesy of their 
neighbours, leaving it free to focus on tasks other than either sea control or sea 
denial.38 A small navy whose enemy is of similar size and capability may seek to 
exploit sea control in order to impose a blockade, conduct strikes from the sea or 
support expeditionary operations in a manner more commonly associated with larger 
navies. The Pacific War of 1879-1883 provides a good illustration of this. The general 
point is that the roles that smaller navies fulfil are not pre-ordained but rather reflect 
local needs and ambitions. 
 
Smaller navies who do fear attack by a stronger enemy are still likely to focus on sea 
denial as a more realistic option than sea control. Classic means of achieving sea 
denial include mines, submarines, fast attack craft and flotilla vessels and land based 
aircraft. In the 1970s Admiral Stansfield Turner described sea denial as ‘guerrilla 
warfare at sea’ where, through the use of hit and run attacks, and the exploitation of 
surprise and manoeuvre, an inferior force can threaten a larger foe.39 For some navies 
sea denial may be the primary role, with little or no intent that this will translate into 
sea control. For others sea denial might be viewed as a stepping stone to sea control 
and it is quite possible for a navy to pursue a sea denial strategy in one area whilst 
simultaneously seeking to gain sea control elsewhere. 
 
Sea denial capabilities can rest on assets that are relatively cheap (such as mines) or 
that are rather expensive (such as multi-role frigates) but, as a general rule of thumb, 
the attempt to deny use of the sea does not require the same range and scale of assets 
as does sea control and thus, as an option, this may appeal to those navies with limited 
budgets and an apparent need. Indeed, in recent decades the introduction of new 
technology, such as anti-ship missiles, the development of affordable and potent 
diesel-electric submarines and the continued threat posed by mines appears to offer 
small navies the type of potency against larger foes that the Jeune Ecole anticipated, 
but could not deliver. Indeed, the danger of anti-access sea denial weaponry has had 
an important impact on the thinking of larger navies, and most obviously the US 
Navy, whose concepts for over the horizon operations are designed to reduce this 
threat.40 
 
Coastal defence implies sea denial within coastal waters and is primarily aimed at 
protecting the coast from sea borne attack. It tends to involve both sea based 
capabilities and land based systems, such as aircraft and coastal missile and/or 
artillery batteries. In the nineteenth century US naval policy for any war with Britain 
tended to focus on coastal defence, with the construction of coastal fortifications and 
ships designed for inshore defence, in addition to commerce raiding on the high seas. 
                                                 
38 See O’Confhaola, ‘The Naval Forces of the Irish State’ passim. 
39 See Geoffrey Till, Seapower. A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, (London: Frank Cass, 2004)  
pp.157-9 
40 For an examination of US concerns see ‘Focus on China’, US Naval Institute Proceedings, April 
2011; Ronal O’Rourke, China’s Naval Modernization. Implications for US Naval Capabilities, 
(Congressional Research Service, 2012). 
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In the late 1920 and 1930s the Soviet New School developed an approach to coastal 
defence based on an integrated system of local defence based on mines, coastal 
artillery, submarines and motor torpedo boats. It is interesting to note that they 
abandoned this approach in the late 1930s and returned to a more traditional vision 
built around a more balanced fleet.41 As ambitions changed, so did strategy. 
 
The history of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Navy) (PLA(N)) from 1949 
until the 1980s appears to provide an almost textbook example of a small navy 
tailored to protect local waters in cooperation with land and air forces, with an 
emphasis on coastal defence and sea denial capabilities. That history does offer 
occasional examples of more ambitious activity and an illustration of what a small 
navy can achieve, particularly when it is one arm of a major regional power. The 
seizure of the Paracel islands from South Vietnamese control in 1974, conflict with 
Vietnam over the Spratley Islands in 1988 and the bloodless seizure of Mischief Reef 
from the Philippines in 1995 provides clear evidence of what a small navy can 
achieve against a weaker rival.42 
 
That Chinese naval ambitions and capabilities have grown since the 1980s reflects the 
growth in Chinese national power. It could also lend credence to the erroneous 
assumption that the small coastal defence navy represents an inferior state of being 
that naturally evolves into a more mature version of maritime power, focused on sea 
control and blue water operations, once resources allow. One might argue that this is 
indeed the route that the PLA(N) is taking, following a path trodden previously by the 
Soviet, Imperial German and US Navies, all of whom graduated from coastal defence 
and/or commerce raiding to a more Mahanian role. It is, of course, a route that most 
navies never follow. 
 
Small navies today 
 
The growth of Chinese power is one of the more frequently discussed issues in 
international relations today and there is no shortage of commentary focusing on 
Chinese naval policy and its impact on the region and beyond. It does provide an 
interesting case study of the way in which the increasing naval power of one state 
necessarily has an impact on others. US paranoia about the development by China of 
new anti-access weapons, such as ‘carrier-killing’ missiles, represents just one aspect 
of this.43 Smaller regional navies will also have to adjust their policies to 
accommodate new realities at sea.44 There is nothing new in this. Small navies living 
in the shadow of larger rivals have always had to seek some way of dealing with 
                                                 
41 R.W. Herrick, Soviet Naval Theory and Policy, (Washington: US Govt Printing Office, 1988) 
passim. Also see Brian Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
institute Press, 1984) 
42 For an interpretation that examines the growth of Chinese naval power within a framework that is 
redolent of Mahan and Corbett see Thomas Kane, Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power, 
(London: Routledge, 2002). 
43 See ‘China’s Carrier Killers’ in Newsweek, 4 October 2011; Lt Cdr Mathew Harper, ‘Chinese 
Missiles and the Walmart Factor’, in US Naval Institute Proceedings, July 2011; Andrew S. Erickson 
and David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the Antiship 
Ballistic Missile,” Naval War College Review, vol. 62, no. 4 (Autumn 2009), 
44 For an example of the impact on Australian policy see Leszek Buszynski, ‘Emerging Naval Rivalry 
in East Asia and the Indian Ocean: Implications for Australia’ in Security Challenges, Vol.5, No. 3 
(2009) 
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them. The experience of the Royal Norwegian Navy offers another interesting 
example of this.  
 
Norway has a large merchant navy and, from the 1970s, significant offshore oil and 
gas resources whose protection poses a complex challenge that few small navies 
share. The Norwegian approach as an alliance member during the Cold War balanced 
the need to contribute to collective and national self defence with a belief in the need 
to reassure the Soviet Union and to avoid provocation that harked back to earlier days 
of neutrality. In common with many small powers both past and present Norway has 
therefore tended to emphasise the importance of international law as one route 
towards security. The primary threat to Norway, posed by the Soviet Union, led 
eventually to an emphasis on a complex layered defence that integrated joint assets 
including land based aircraft, coastal artillery and missiles, fast attack craft and 
submarines that could act together synergistically, exploiting local geography and a 
superior knowledge of local conditions, to deter and, if necessary, disrupt any Soviet 
attack. Ultimately, of course, a successful defence depended on the arrival of alliance 
support but it was clear that Norway needed an ability to protect itself prior to the 
arrival of any help and also, critically, it needed an ability to protect national self 
interest in limited scenarios that might not trigger an alliance response. This called for 
balanced capabilities that provided a focus on coastal defence and sea denial but also 
offered an ability to operate further offshore in defence of fish stocks, oil and gas 
reserves and national sovereignty. Given this it is notable that, while the Norwegian 
armed forces were reduced at the end of the Cold War, the Coastguard grew in both 
size and importance. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet fleet made 
the coastal defence role less urgent and brought a new emphasis using maritime 
resources to contribute to UN peace support operations overseas, a development 
mirrored by other Scandinavian navies.45  
 
The outcome of controversies over the nature of Norwegian defence policy, and of the 
balance to be placed on land or sea-based systems, reflect the different inputs into the 
policy process. In some respects these suggest features unique to the Norwegian 
experience, particularly the debate over the emphasis to place on fixed coastal 
artillery sites, while in other respects debates, such as that occurred in the 1960s 
between ‘traditionalists’ who favoured an ocean-going capability built around large 
destroyers and ‘modernisers’ who preferred a greater number of smaller assets, were 
common in many navies. 
 
Building on the Norwegian experience Borresen sought to establish a theory of the 
sea power of the ‘coastal state’, defined as ‘a small or medium sized state that is 
situated by the sea and whose national interest to a considerable extent is connected 
to the sea’.46 Despite avoiding the phrase his focus was on smaller navies. His aim 
was to develop a theory that would apply to all coastal states by suggesting how they 
might ‘think about seapower’ despite a wide variance in roles, tasks and capabilities. 
He shared with Till a belief that such variance meant that there could be no model for 
a small/coastal navy beyond the understanding that in order to be worthwhile they 
must be relevant to the political leaders of the state to which they beyond. Relevance 
depends on the ability to do something useful within the context of state policy. 
                                                 
45 Rolf Tamnes , ‘Major Coastal State – Small Naval Power: Norway’s Cold War Policy and Strategy’, 
in Hobson & Kristiansen, Navies and Northern Waters, pp222-248. 
46 Borresen, ‘Coastal Power’, p.250. 
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Borresen provides an interesting examination of what that ‘something useful’ might 
be. He also offers an insight into some of the constraints facing smaller navies. 
Perhaps inevitably his conclusions reflected his position as a Commodore in the 
Norwegian Navy and one could argue that what he offers is really an examination of 
the sea power of the Norwegian state, but his analysis is useful nonetheless. 
 
According to Borresen the primary task of the coastal state is not to seek sea control 
on the high seas but to protect resources within the 200nm Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) and to prevent violations of home waters. He notes that the territorialisation of 
the sea resulting from UNCLOS III represents an erosion of the principle of the 
freedom of the seas that benefits the coastal state while also setting new challenges in 
terms of the protection of sovereignty and the offshore estate. This requires some 
form of naval power, notwithstanding limits in terms of range, scope and scale. He 
argues that the failure to enforce jurisdiction within these waters can create a vacuum 
that will draw in other actors. Adherence to international law is identified as an 
important bulwark against the ambitions of larger navies. Indeed, he explains that 
through adherence to international law and ‘legitimate, efficient, predictable and even 
handed enforcement of  sovereignty in territorial waters and of jurisdiction in the 
EEZ’ one can remove the incentive for other states to intervene military while, 
conversely, the inability to offer this can invite unwanted attention.47 
 
Borresen recognises that in times of war the coastal state is unlikely to be able to 
protect its full EEZ and will instead have to focus on inshore waters and the 
protection of its coastline. Given the likely outcome of any war with a major power 
the main interest of the coastal state is in avoiding war. The coastal navy can help to 
deter war by providing a credible deterrent through an ability to inflict significant 
military, diplomatic or economic cost on an aggressor. This tends to require a 
defensive structure that can exploit local conditions to maximise the cost of any attack 
and also forces able provide a threshold that the attacker must cross or back down. In 
this context a balanced force is valuable as it provides the ability to deal with a wide 
range of incursions and, if there are sufficient resources to challenge an intrusion 
wherever it occurs, can force an opponent into an overt act of aggression. While 
quality is liable to count for much in any fight in coastal waters quantity does have its 
merits. When acting as a threshold (‘tripwire’ in Kearsley’s model) the ability to be 
present at an engagement may matter more than the ability to survive it. Borresen’s 
conclusions appear to confirm Kearsley’s idea that small navies will generally seek to 
fulfil the same roles as larger one, noting the importance of not allowing a potential 
opponent the ability to oppose national interests at sea unchallenged. As he notes, in 
an appeal to international opinion ‘a magnificent and spectacular rout may come in 
just as handy as an unexpected victory’.48 
 
In contrast, the Irish Naval Service has not traditionally focused on sea denial tasks 
but has instead emphasised constabulary duties including fishery protection and 
operations designed to counteract arms and drugs smuggling whilst also maintaining a 
presence in Ireland’s territorial seas and undertaking occasional forays further afield 
on diplomatic duties and also in support of the Irish forces deployed overseas on UN 
missions. As one would expect the ships of the Service are optimised for their likely 
                                                 
47 Borresen, ‘Coastal Power’. Also see, Jacob Borresen, ‘The Seapower of the Coastal State’ in Journal 
of Strategic Studies, Vol.17, Issue 1, 1994. 
48 Borresen, ‘Coastal Power’, p.254 
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roles and possess a modest combat capability that does not include anti-ship missiles, 
air defence missiles, torpedoes, mines or any anti-submarine capability. This is largely 
a reflection of the benign environment in which they operate and in the expectation 
that in a more complex environment they would operate as part of a larger coalition in 
which coalition partners could be expected to fulfil war-fighting tasks. 
 
The current Irish fleet reflects many of the challenges that small navies face in 
maintaining capabilities. The Naval Service currently operates eight ships, at least six 
of which are approaching the end of their useful lives. The largest, LE Eithne is 
designated a Helicopter Patrol Vessel although, tellingly, it no longer has an aviation 
role and the Naval Service does not possess any helicopters. Eithne was built at the 
Verlome yard in Cork (Ireland), as were the Service’s three Offshore Patrol Vessels 
(LE Aoife, Aisling, and Emer). Unfortunately the yard proved uneconomic despite 
significant government subsidies and it has now closed. Consequently the Service’s 
two most recent ships, the Large Patrol Vessels LE Roisin and LE Niamh, were built 
at Appledore (UK) and are modified versions of the Mauritius Coastguard’s 
Guardian-class ships. The construction of these vessels was 65 per cent paid for by 
the EU, a sign of the importance of Irish waters to the security and prosperity of the 
European Union.49 The remaining two vessels, the coastal patrol vessels LE Orla and 
Ciara  were formerly HMS Swift and Swallow, Hong Kong patrol ships. Purchased 
from the British in 1988 they have not proven to be entirely suited to North Atlantic 
waters, demonstrating the difficulty of relying on second hand equipment designed for 
another environment. 
 
An examination of the Irish experience would suggest that some navies do not feel the 
need to fill the full range of roles and missions identified by Kearsley. However, at 
different times during its history (and pre-history50) the Irish Naval Service has 
conducted operations or focused on missions that include maritime power projection 
(during the Civil War 1922-23), sea denial and coastal defence (1939-45) and seaward 
defence (1950s) in addition to their familiar coastguard roles of fishery protection, 
counter-smuggling, the maintenance of good order at sea etc.51 Since the late 1970s 
the Naval Service has undertaken operations in support of Irish forces deployed 
overseas on UN missions and from the 1980s has undertaken diplomatic visits across 
Europe, to the United States, South America and into Asian waters. Accession to the 
EEC and the adoption of a 200-nm Exclusive Economic Zone significantly increased 
the constabulary work-load, helping to maintain the relevance of a service 
traditionally overshadowed by an army dominated defence structure and a 
government bureaucracy rarely inclined to look seaward. Recent Irish claims to 
jurisdiction over their continental shelf further increase the sea area to be policed, 
simultaneously providing economic opportunity and an additional burden for the 
navy.52 
 
                                                 
49 Tim Fish, ‘Irish Naval Service: small fish sets its sights on a bigger pool’, in Jane’s Navy 
International, 01 October 2007. 
50 The Irish Naval Service was formally founded in 1946 but its predecessors, the Marine and 
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51 See O’Confhaola, ‘Naval Forces of the Irish state’ passim. 
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It remains to be seen how well the Irish Naval Service will weather the financial 
storm that currently afflicts Ireland, and also the rest of the EU. The Service has 
developed plans to replace its now ageing fleet, focusing on their constabulary duties 
but also on the potential for ships to provide more active support to Irish forces 
overseas. The Service has also developed a partnership with civil industry and 
education in an attempt to encourage innovation and investment that will allow 
Ireland to ‘unlock’ its energy and maritime potential. Perhaps unusually for a navy, 
the Irish Naval Service thus promotes wealth creation and intellectual innovation in 
non- military spheres.53 In a country with little public appreciation of its maritime 
heritage and little understanding of the potential uses of the sea the process may help 
the Naval Service to prove its relevance and to make a positive contribution to the 
recovery of the Irish economy. Whatever the case, it would appear to demonstrate that 
it is difficult to generalise about the inputs and outputs of naval policy. 
 
In Conclusion  
 
It is clearly difficult to define precisely what one means by the term ‘small navy’. 
Definitions based on the size of the navy, or of the state to which it belongs, are 
problematic. ‘Smallness’ does relate to relative size but must also take into account a 
range of other factors, including role, reputation and self-image. Till’s suggestion that 
small navies are those with ‘limited means and aspirations’ is useful given that 
precise definitions based on quantitative factors may be misleading. All navies, small 
or large, must be understood within their own particular context and with an 
understanding of their intended roles. Rather than seeking a precise definition of what 
is and is not a ‘small navy’ it may be more appropriate to establish the extent to which 
such navies have purposes, functions and characteristics that distinguish them from 
larger navies and to ask the associated question of whether concepts and strategies 
devised for larger navies have the same relevance for those with different roles and 
characteristics. The dominance of the Anglo-American tradition in maritime thought, 
and the tendency of naval historians and maritime commentators to approach the 
subject on the terms implied by this tradition, may undermine our understanding of 
navies for whom a different approach may be more appropriate. Thus, it is important 
to question whether or not small navies are sufficiently different from larger navies to 
warrant investigation as a distinct group or whether the differences between the large 
and the small are more a matter of degree than of kind, as has often been argued.  
Equally one should ask whether there are sufficient commonalities between different 
small navies to allow for the identification of the kind of shared characteristics that 
would make employment of the term useful. To use Kearsley’s terminology, to what 
extent do the inputs and outputs of naval policy differentiate small navies from large 
navies and to what extent do they differentiate or connect small navies from or to each 
other? 
 
The aim of this paper was to identify rather than to answer the questions noted above 
and to act as a ‘call to arms’ for others to take up the challenge, to help answer these 
questions and to identify others. This paper represents an early step in a ‘small navies’ 
project being developed by the Centre of Military History and Strategic Studies at the 
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 19 
National University of Ireland Maynooth in partnership with the Irish Naval Service, 
Liverpool Hope University and the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at 
King’s College London.  Hopefully that project will provide some answers and, in 
doing so, will shed important light onto a neglected aspect of maritime strategy and 
policy.  
